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In the Davis case, supra, and the Tri-State Coach Corp. case,
supra, the impulse or emotion arose out of an act which was within
the scope of employment and the defendant was held liable. In
Gary v. Hotel Reuger, Inc.,13 the impulse or emotion arose out of
an act outside of the scope of employment and the defendant
was found not liable.
Thus in Virginia the requirements for a proper charge to the
jury on the scope of employment question are as follows: The jury
must initially consider whether or not the act of the defendant's
servant occurred within the course of the master's business. In de-
termining this fact the jury should be guided by the Strict Scope of
Employment Test and the Furtherance of the Master's Business
Test. If the jury finds that the act which the defendant's servant
was engaged in performing at the time the cause of action arose
was not within the scope of his employment, they shall find the
defendant not liable. However, if the jury finds that the defendant's
servant was acting within the scope of employment, they must then
consider whether the impulse or emotion incident to the act upon
which the cause of action is predicated, was itself within the scope
of employment. If the jury finds that it was, they shall find for the
plaintiff; otherwise, their verdict shall be for the defendant.
D. C. R.
CONTRACTS-INTERFERENCE WITH RIGHT
OF CONTRACT
The conflicts arising from the interference of free competition
with the individual's right to contract has long been a difficult
problem to solve within the frame-work of legal principles. Attempts
to formulate a concrete doctrine on this subject have induced, in
many instances, more confusion than clarification.'
The key issue involved in these disputes is the extent to which
interference with contractual relations may be privileged as a pro-
tection of defendants interests or as a benefit to society.
'3 195 Va. 980, 81 S.E.2d 421 (1952).
1 See Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 Harv. L., Rev. 663 (1923);
Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1894);
Restatement of Torts, Sees. 762, 766, 767, 771, 772; Note, 9 Va. L. Rev.
212 (1923).
The case of Zoby v. American Fidelity Company,2 presents a
unique question in this area of Virginia litigation.
Defendants were sureties on a bond for performance of a Navy
Department contract which stood in default. When called upon
by the Navy for performance on their bond, the agent for the sure-
ties recommended that the $268,738.00 bid of plaintiff construction
company be accepted to complete the original contract. Defendants
intimated that plaintiff "had the job" and plaintiff immediately
placed a Watchman on the site and took other steps preliminary to
performance of the contract.
Later, defendant's agent revoked his recommendation of plain-
tiff and substituted a recommendation that the contract for com-
pletion of the construction be given to a second contractor who had
underbid plaintiff by $7,785.00. The contract was subsequently
awarded to the second contractor, and plaintiff sued for willful and
malicious prevention of his contemplated contract with the Navy.
In granting defendant sureties' motion for summary judgment
and thus resolving the outcome in favor of free competition, the
court said:
. . . the better rule seems to be that the right of free com-
petition offsets the interests of the unsuccessful party
plaintiff where defendant interferes with the plaintiff's
right to contract.
In reaching a verdict the court compared the principal case
with Kurtz v. Oremland and Bailey v. Barrister.4
In the Kurtz case, plaintiff had contracted to purchase a retail
leather business, subject to approval of the lessor of the premises.
Defendant offered lessor's agent a larger commission for securing
lessor's approval in favor of his purchase, resulting in the selection
of defendant's offer over plaintiff's offer due to the agent's state-
ments in favor of defendant.
In rendering a verdict for defendant, the court held that
plaintiff's loss was a "mere incident of competition" and no action-
able wrong was effected.
2 143 Fed. Supp. 763 (1956).
3 33 N. J. Super 443, 111 A. 2d 100 (1954).
4 200 F. 2d 683 (1952).
In the Bailey case, plaintiff had contracted to purchase a 105
acre tract of land for $16,000 from a restricted Indian, subject to
approval of the Department of Interior. Defendant offered to pur-
chase five acres of the tract from plaintiff for $2,500 and advised
plaintiff that if he did not accept their offer, they would bid $20,000
for the tract and "run up" the price. Plaintiff refused defendant's
offer and defendant notified the Department of Interior that they
would bid not less than $20,000 for the entire tract, whereupon the
Department of Interior deferred action on plaintiff's contract and
advertised the property for sale to the highest bidder. Plaintiff pur-
chased the property at auction for $25,025 or $9,025 in excess of
the original price.
In dismissing plaintiff's suit, the court said:
. . . even in cases where a breach of contract has been
procured, there is no liability if the breach was caused by
the exercise of an absolute right.
Thus, in both the Kurtz and Bailey cases the defendant's act,
while bordering on the unethical, was in the eyes of the court
nothing more than a buyer making a higher offer than his com-
petitor.
In comparing these two cases, the court expressed the view
that they came closer to justifying a recovery than the controversy
presented by the principal case.
In neither of the two cited cases nor the principal case was
there an actual enforceable contract; thus, the issue is clearly one
of interference with prospective contractual relations and not the
inducing of a breach of contract.
The case law on this subject is difficult to rationalize. Due to
the inherent nature of the problem, the development of the law has
been based more on historical and economic policies than on strict
legal theory5 . The absence of a legal principle was very troublesome
to the courts in deciding the earlier cases, 6 but this general reluc-
tance to allow a recovery has been overcome by the desire to de-
5 Jones, Historical Development of the Law of Business Competition, 35
Yale L. J. 905, (1926); continued 36 Yale L. J. 42 and 351 (1926-27).
699 A. L. R. 12 (1935).
velop a flexible legal system that will keep pace with the changing
needs of society.7
Today the law does recognize the right to protection of an
interest in anticipated business relationships8 and has even gone
so far as to indicate that an action will lie for injury to plaintiff's
social relations. 9 Thus, the distinction between inducing a breach
of an existing contract and interfering with a prospective contract
is important, primarily, in measuring the extent to which the
privilege of interference will outweigh the plaintiff's right to con-
tract without interference.
Judge Hoffman, in deciding the Zoby case, adopts Prosser's' 0
general statement that in cases of prospective advantage, the priv-
ilege is more extensive than in cases where an actual contract exists.
The court very wisely attempts to go no further than this and con-
cludes that each case must be determined on its own facts.
In the principal case, the court felt that the substantial ec-
onomic obligation imposed upon defendants by their bond was a
sufficient interest to afford them the protection of privilege.'1
While the outcome in each case will depend upon its own
peculiar circumstances, the decided cases offer a valuable indica-
tion of the points considered by the courts in reaching a verdict. In
general, there must be a reasonable expectation of economic ad-
vantage' 2 and the interference must be unlawful or malicious,"'
although there is considerable disharmony on this latter point.' 4
At any rate, the interference must be something more than mere
7 "The law of England is a living law. It develops, and must develop, ac-
cording to changes in the social life and social outlook. It has long since
been pointed out that under our system of law the novelty of a claim
is no answer to it." Best v. Fox, 2 All.E.R. 798, 800 (K. B. 1950). And
see Grismore, Are Unfair Methods of Competition Actionable at the
Suit of a Competitor, 33 Mich. L.Rev. 321 (1935).
8 Prosser on Torts, 2nd Ed., Sec. 107 (1955).
9 Deon v. Kirby Lumber Co., 162 La. 671, 111 So. 55 (1925).
10 Prosser on Torts, 2nd Ed., p. 745 (1955).
"1 Actual loss to sureties due to default of original contractor amounted to
$30,000.
12 Campbell v. Rayburn, 129 Cal. 232, 276 P.2d 671 (1954).
13 Owen v. Williams, 322 Mass. 356, 77 N.E.2d. 318 (1948); Outdoor Sports
Corp. v. A.F. of L., Local 23132 et. al., 6 N.J. 217, 78 A.2d 69 (1951).
24 Huskie v. Griffin, 75 N.H. 345, 74 A. 595 (1909). And see note, 38 Minn.
L.Rev. 415 (1954).
competition.' The doctrine is not fully established and there are
recent cases indicating that an action will not lie, unless a valid
contract was in existence. 6 But, the majority rule and decided
trend is in accord with the Zoby case.
The Zoby case, while no more than persuasive authority in the
state courts at the present time, offers a rational and legally sus-
tainable approach to the troublesome problems that are certain to
arise in this area of litigation. Its adoption is recommended as the
guiding rule for Virginia.
P. T. W.
CRIMINAL LAW-CONTEMPT OF
PROBATION ORDER
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in a recent case'
reversed.a judgment of the Circuit Court of Hanover County which
was a summary punishment for contempt of judicial process.
The appellant, appearing in the trial of his wife on a house-
breaking charge, had requested that she be released on probation,
and in response to the court's verbal order had promised to assist
in her probation. Subsequent reports by probation officers resulted
in a rule against appellant to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt. Appellant was convicted and sentenced to
twelve months in jail for contempt in interfering with the probation
of his wife.
Two basic issues were presented to both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals: (1) The jurisdictional power of the court to issue
the order to assist in probation; and (2) The sufficiency of the evi-
dence to support the charge of contempt. The trial court held that
it had general jurisdictional power of both the subject matter and
the parties, and further that the evidence of the husband's conduct
was sufficient to support a contempt proceeding.
15 Union Car Advertising Co., Inc. v. Collier et. al., 263 N.Y. 386, 189 N.E.
463 (1934).
16 Morgan v. Speight, 242 N.C. 603, 89 S.E.2d 137 (1955).
1 Bryant v. Comomnwealth, 198 Va. 148, 93 S.E.2d. 130 (1956).
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